are true or false. For example, the well-known emotivist Charles L. Stevenson says that they are. He writes:
So let us agree, in deference to our language, to say that ethical judgments are either true or false (Stevenson 1963, p. 216). However, what he means by this is presumably something like the following: (1) Sentences of the form "It is true that p" and "It is false that p" are linguistically permissable if and only if "p" is replaced by a sentence in the declarative mood; (2) The sentences by which we express our moral convictions are normally in the declarative mood; (3) If "p" is replaced by some well-formed sentence in the declarative mood, the sentence "It is true that p" has the same meaning as "p " , and "It is false that p" has the same meaning as the negation of "p"; and (4) Ethical or moral sentences express attitudes and, hence, sentences of the form "It is true that p" and "It is false that p" express attitudes when "p" is replaced by an ethical sentence (op. cit., pp. 216-220). On this view, then, to believe that a certain moral statement is true is not to believe in the existence of some fact or state of affairs. It is not to believe anything about the way the world is. It is simply to have a certain attitude.
By contrast, when people say -as they often do -that moral statements or moral convictions are neither true nor false, they are probably using "true" and "false" in a stronger and more ontological sense. Hence, they are not really contradicting Stevenson's view. I suggest that they are using "true" and "false" in a realistic sense which may be roughly characterized as follows. A statement is true (in the realistic sense) if and only if it corresponds to reality, i.e. if and only if it describes a fact which exists independently of anyone's acceptance of the statement, i.e. if and only if it ascribes some property to some existing entity and this entity really has the property in question. Similarly, a statement is false (in the realistic sense) if and only if it corresponds to or describes a fact which does not exist. The notions of truth and falsity which I have in mind have been explained by Roderick M. Chisholm as follows:
A belief or assertion is true provided, fIrst, that it is a belief or assertion with respect to a certain state of affairs that that state of affairs exists, and provided, secondly, that that state of affairs does exist; and a belief or assertion is false provided, fIrst, that it is a belief or assertion with respect to a certain state of affairs that that state of affairs exists, and provided, secondly, that that state of affairs does not exist (Chisholm 1966, p. 103) .
